Source: Rutgers School of Law/Newark
By Jennifer Rikoski and Jonathan Finer
Rutgers Law Record
Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003, an estimated 2 million Iraqis have fled to Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, and other neighboring countries, and another 2.7 million are "internally displaced," meaning uprooted from their homes, but still within Iraq. Many fled not during the invasion, but later, because of the sectarian violence that erupted across the country after the bombing of the Al-Askari mosque in Samarra in February 2006, leading to the Middle East's gravest humanitarian crisis since the Palestinian diaspora of 1948.
Syria hosts roughly 1.4 million Iraqi refugees, many of whom arrived before October 2007 when its virtually porous border with Iraq was closed. Jordan, which effectively closed its border in late 2006, is thought to host approximately 500,000 Iraqi refugees, a group that on average tends to be more affluent and well educated.
Most Iraqi refugees live in cramped apartments in Damascus and Amman, rather than in refugee camps. Although they have access to health care and public schools for their children, few have the right to work and they must survive off of savings or blackmarket labor, making permanent absorption into these countries untenable.
While the hope is that most can eventually return to Iraq, for many, repatriation is simply impossible any time soon. Those who worked with Americans, for example as interpreters, cooks, or building civil society in Iraq, are indelibly branded "traitors" for "collaborating with the invaders." Others, such as secular professionals and religious minorities like the Yezedi and Assyrian Christians, risk being killed by extremists that the Iraqi government tacitly supports or is unable to control. During the peak of sectarian fighting, many Iraqis' homes were destroyed or occupied, causing previously mixed neighborhoods to become increasingly homogeneous. Conditions remain particularly harsh for internally-displaced Iraqis, with many lacking drinkable water, food, and shelter. For many of these Iraqis, moving to a third country is the only realistic solution.
The three main paths for an Iraqi to immigrate to the United States are resettlement in the country as a refugee, asylum for those already within U.S. borders, and "special immigrant visas" for Iraqis who have worked for the U.S. government in Iraq. Fewer than 25,000 Iraqis have been provided a safe haven in the United States since the U.S. invasion: 19,910 Iraqis have arrived as refugees, just over one thousand have been granted asylum, and roughly another thousand have arrived on special immigrant visas. To its credit, the United States is finally reaching its resettlement targets. But many of these Iraqis have been in the pipeline for several years. And the United States could be far more generous in the number of Iraqis it admits.
This article explains, analyzes and critiques the U.S. resettlement program for Iraqi refugees. We describe U.S. policy toward Iraqi refugees and how it has evolved, international conventions and U.S. laws providing protection for Iraqi refugees, and the U.S. refugee admissions process. We then analyze current U.S. law, asserting that, although existing legal mechanisms are largely sufficient to help vast numbers of Iraqi refugees, an understaffed bureaucracy, a lengthy and unnecessarily cumbersome application process, and our relations with Syria impede our ability to carry out the law effectively. We recommend a bureaucratic surge, vigorous diplomacy with Syria, and bold White House leadership to help the most vulnerable Iraqis quickly reach a safe haven in the United States.
While the hope is that most can eventually return to Iraq, for many, repatriation is simply impossible any time soon. Those who worked with Americans, for example as interpreters, cooks, or building civil society in Iraq, are indelibly branded "traitors" for "collaborating with the invaders." Others, such as secular professionals and religious minorities like the Yezedi and Assyrian Christians, risk being killed by extremists that the Iraqi government tacitly supports or is unable to control. During the peak of sectarian fighting, many Iraqis' homes were destroyed or occupied, causing previously mixed neighborhoods to become increasingly homogeneous. Conditions remain particularly harsh for internally-displaced Iraqis, with many lacking drinkable water, food, and shelter. For many of these Iraqis, moving to a third country is the only realistic solution.
The three main paths for an Iraqi to immigrate to the United States are resettlement in the country as a refugee, asylum for those already within U.S. borders, and "special immigrant visas" for Iraqis who have worked for the U.S. government in Iraq. Fewer than 25,000 Iraqis have been provided a safe haven in the United States since the U.S. invasion: 19,910 Iraqis have arrived as refugees, just over one thousand have been granted asylum, and roughly another thousand have arrived on special immigrant visas. To its credit, the United States is finally reaching its resettlement targets. But many of these Iraqis have been in the pipeline for several years. And the United States could be far more generous in the number of Iraqis it admits.
This article explains, analyzes and critiques the U.S. resettlement program for Iraqi refugees. We describe U.S. policy toward Iraqi refugees and how it has evolved, international conventions and U.S. laws providing protection for Iraqi refugees, and the U.S. refugee admissions process. We then analyze current U.S. law, asserting that, although existing legal mechanisms are largely sufficient to help vast numbers of Iraqi refugees, an understaffed bureaucracy, a lengthy and unnecessarily cumbersome application process, and our relations with Syria impede our ability to carry out the law effectively. We recommend a bureaucratic surge, vigorous diplomacy with Syria, and bold White House leadership to help the most vulnerable Iraqis quickly reach a safe haven in the United States.
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