"La situazione sta peggiorando. Gridate con noi che i diritti umani sono calpestati da persone che parlano in nome di Dio ma che non sanno nulla di Lui che è Amore, mentre loro agiscono spinti dal rancore e dall'odio.
Gridate: Oh! Signore, abbi misericordia dell'Uomo."

Mons. Shleimun Warduni
Baghdad, 19 luglio 2014

1 agosto 2019

Buone vacanze!

By Baghdadhope*

Foto by Ryan McGuire

Sinodo della chiesa caldea ad Erbil. 3/13 agosto 2019: dati

By Baghdadhope*

Di seguito l'elenco in ordine alfabetico dei 23 vescovi che compongono il sinodo della chiesa caldea che si terrà dal 3 al 13 di agosto 2019 ad Erbil, nel Kurdistan iracheno. 


1. Alnaufali  Habib (1960)
24/01/2014  Arcivescovo di Bassora

2. Alqas  Rabban

06/12/2001 Vescovo di Amadiya

11/07/2013  Vescovo di Zakho ed Amadhiya

3. Audo  Antoine

8/01/1992  Vescovo di Aleppo

4. Garmou  Ramzi

05/05/1995 Arcivescovo  coadiutore  di Tehran

07/02/1999 Arcivescovo di Tehran
Visitatore Apostolico per l’Europa
19/11/2016 Dimissioni dalla carica di Visitatore Apostolico

22/12/2018 Arcivescovo di Diarbekir dei Caldei (Turchia) 

5. Ibrahim N. Ibrahim

11/01/1982 Esarca Apostolico USA

07/03/1982 Vescovo titolare Anbar dei Caldei

03/08/1985 Vescovo USA est (San Tommaso Apostolo)

03/01/2014  Vescovo emerito

6. Isaac Jacques

07/05/1997 Arcivescovo di Erbil

04/05/1999 Dimissioni dalla carica vescovile

21/12/2005 Arcivescovo titolare di Nisibis dei Caldei e Vescovo ausiliare

19/12/2012 - 01/02/2013 Amministratore della chiesa caldea

15/01/2015  Arcivescovo Emerito

7. Jammo  Sarhad Y.

21/05/2002  Vescovo USA ovest (San Pietro Apostolo)
07/05/2016 Vescovo Emerito

Jarjis Robert (1973)
Vescovo ausiliare di Baghdad e titolare di Arsamosata
03/06/2019 Vescovo ausiliare per gli affari culturali

9. Kalabat Francis

03/05/2014  Vescovo USA est (San Tommaso Apostolo)
09/08/2017 - 31/10/2017
Amministratore Apostolico dell’Eparchia di Sant'Addai (Canada)

10. Kassab Jibrail

24/10/1995 Arcivescovo di Bassora

21/10/2006 Arcivescovo di Australia e Nuova Zelanda (San Tommaso Apostolo)

15/01/2015 Arcivescovo Emerito

11. Kassarji Michael

18/01/2001  Vescovo di Beirut

12. Maqdassi Mikha P.

06/12/2001  Vescovo di Alqosh

13. Meram  Thomas

30/11/1983  Arcivescovo di Urmia e Vescovo di Salmas, ora Emerito

Moussa Najib Mikhael O.P. (1955)
22/12/2018 Arcivescovo di Mosul

15. Nona Emil S.

13/11/2009 Arcivescovo di Mosul

06/02/2015  Arcivescovo di Australia e Nuova Zelanda (San Tommaso Apostolo)

16. Sako Louis

27/09/2003 Arcivescovo di Kirkuk

01/02/2013 Patriarca di Babilonia dei Caldei
Cardinale 28/06/2018

17. Shaleta  Emanuel Hana

06/02/2015 Vescovo del Canada (Sant'Addai)
Vescovo USA ovest (San Pietro Apostolo)

18. Sirop Saad

24/01/2014 Vescovo di curia patriarcale
19/11/2016  Visitatore Apostolico per l’Europa

19. Soro Bawai

11/01/2015 Vescovo in servizio pastorale  presso la diocesi degli Stati Uniti Occidentali 
(San Pietro Apostolo)

Vescovo dell'Eparchia di Sant'Addai (Canada)

20. Thomas Yousif

24/01/2014 Arcivescovo di Kirkuk

21. Warda  Bashar M.

24/05/2010  Arcivescovo di Erbil

22. Warduni  Shleimun

12/01/2001 Vescovo titolare Anbar dei Caldei e Vescovo di curia patriarcale
Amministratore Apostolico sede vacante dell’Eparchia Saint Peter the Apostle of San Diego dei Caldei
Vescovo titolare Anbar dei Caldei e Vescovo ausiliare emerito

23. Yaldo  Basel

06/02/2015 Vescovo ausiliare di Baghdad e titolare di
03/06/2019 Vescovo ausiliare per gli affari pastorali

After ISIS, Both Minorities And Majorities Struggle In The Face Of Dysfunctional Governments

By Middle East Research Institute
Alberto M. Fernandez

Five years ago, Iraq's summer of ethnic cleansing and genocide unrolled between June 2014 and August 2014, as the Islamic State (ISIS) targeted religious minorities for destruction – first in the city of Mosul and then in Sinjar and Nineveh Plains. The situation of these Christian and Yazidi minorities five years later is an object lesson in the challenges of administration, reconstruction, and resilience in Iraq and the region. If the targeting of these groups was an object lesson in religious hatred five years ago, their fate today is a lesson in the importance of good governance for minorities and majorities.
After the stunning June fall of Mosul into the hands of a small group of ISIS fighters, the city's ancient Christian population was targeted, their property appropriated (marked with the Arabic letter N for Nasara, the Quranic term for Christian), with almost the entire population fleeing by July 2014. Many of these Mosul Christians would be displaced a second time when, a month later, ISIS overran the historic Christians villages on the Nineveh Plain and 100,000 fled, with hours to spare, as Kurdish Peshmerga forces withdrew from their defensive lines.
The ISIS assault on Yazidis in Sinjar beginning August 3, 2014 was much more horrific, with thousands killed on the spot and 6,000 women, girls and children kidnapped, enslaved, raped, and brainwashed.[1] There is no doubt that the ISIS goal was to exterminate Yazidis as a distinct people. In other words, genocide.
While these tiny religious-ethnic groups, Yazidis and Assyrian Christians, were selected for particularly harsh treatment, ISIS violence was nothing if not pervasive across all ethnic and religious groups. That bloody summer five years ago also saw the largest single ISIS massacre in Iraq – of mostly Shia Muslim Iraqi Air Force cadets at Camp Speicher in June 2014 – and the largest single ISIS massacre in Syria – of Sunni Muslim Shaitat tribesmen in Eastern Syria, in August 2014.
Five years later, what is the current situation of these groups ISIS sought to extinguish? Mosul was regained, after bitter fighting, in February 2017. While the eastern part of the city was captured relatively intact, ISIS fought fiercely in Mosul's old city, leaving much of that historic district devastated. Of the roughly 6,000 Christians in Mosul in 2014, fewer than 100 have returned home. Up to 1,000 Christians travel to Mosul on daily basis for work or school from neighboring villages.[2]
On the Nineveh Plain, retaken from ISIS in October 2016, about 46% of the pre-ISIS population has returned (41,000 out of an estimated 90,000). The destruction caused by ISIS occupation and the battle to liberate the region was massive.[3] Much of the reconstruction has come from international Catholic organizations such as Aid to the Church in Need and the Knights of Columbus. The governments of Hungary and the U.S. have also played a productive role.
Sinjar was partially retaken from ISIS in November 2015, with much of the city reduced to rubble (it had a pre-ISIS population of 80,000). The area was a bone of contention between Iraqi Kurdish forces and Baghdad until October 2017, when the Peshmerga surrendered the now fully liberated region to the Iraqi Army and PMF militias. There has been almost no reconstruction in Sinjar, and almost 300,000 people from the region are still displaced elsewhere in Iraq.[4] Of course, some of the missing population in Sinjar, Mosul, and Nineveh Plain is now in Europe or Australia, or died somewhere along the way fleeing Iraq.
In all three areas, lack of security is a double threat that inhibits both population returns and reconstruction: the danger of a return of ISIS elements who had enthusiastic support from the region's local Sunni Arab population and the depredations of Iranian supported militias who are a law unto themselves.[5] The lack of economic opportunity is a further obstacle.
Some Iraqi government support for reconstruction exists on paper and has been allocated in the federal budget, but inefficiency and corruption are major problems – throughout the country, not just in these devastated zones.[6] With hundreds of thousands of Nineveh Governorate's citizens still displaced, the former governor, now a fugitive from justice, was accused of embezzling more than $10 million intended for IDPs.[7] Almost 10% of the governorate's budget seems to have gone missing.
It would be easy to blame the struggles of Iraq's desperate Yazidis and marginalized Assyrian Christians on bigotry, religious extremism, or foreign machinations by Iran. All those factors are real.
There are also people and politicians of good will in Iraq, from its President Barham Saleh on down, who work hard to make things better for all of the country's citizens. The problem for Iraq's minorities is less bigotry or extremism than incompetence, corruption, and poor governance. This is a challenge that bedevils all citizens, and certainly is not unique to Iraq. Indeed, because there is still some political and media space in Iraq in comparison to many of its neighbors, and there are mechanisms which can expose at least some abuse.